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Diana T Fritz 08/26/2006 04:47:06 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable
Text:

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 03169

SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: ECON
INFO: ICE DAO P/M AMB CDA DCM POL

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MQUINN
DRAFTED: ECON:ACURTIS
CLEARED: ICE:BADADA, CG:TBRYS, P/M:DWALTON

VZCZCADI646
PP RUEHC RUEHBJ RUEHDE RHEFHLC RUEAIIA
DE RUEHAD #3169 2171402
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051402Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6458
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0182
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6336
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003169

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR ISN, T, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: UAE CLAIM TO NEED MORE INFORMATION IN ORDER TO
INTERDICT IRANIAN VESSEL

REF: A. SECSTATE 127528
[1](#)B. CDA QUINN/ISN RUSSEL 8/4 EMAIL EXCHANGE

Classified By: CDA Martin Quinn, a.i., for reasons 1.4 b and d.

[1](#)1. (S/NF) On August 4 CDA met with MFA Director of Arab Affairs, Ambassador Hamad Saeed Al-Zaabi shortly before Friday noon prayers to request action on ref A NIACT. CDA explained that the USG had information indicating that the "Iran Isfahan," which had docked in Dubai that morning, was carrying Chinese-origin graphite intended for use in Iran's missile program. It was requested that the UAEG inspect and detain the cargo. In earlier telcon MFA Asst U/S for International Cooperation Mohamed Abdulrahim Abduljalil pledged that UAE would do whatever it could to cooperate in the matter.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) At 1330 DHS/ICE attache AbdulRahman Adada delivered reftel points to Khalid Khamas, Dubai Customs Executive Director of Planning. Khamas said that Dubai Customs would look into the matter. At 1530, Khamas contacted Adada and said that since the "Iran Isfahan" contained 400-600 containers, it would be very difficult to locate the containers of concern without container numbers. Khamas said the ship was scheduled to depart Port Rashid at 1900 (local), and that there was not much time to find the suspected cargo. This information was reported to the Department at approximately 1800 local time.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) At about 2030 local time, Asst U/S Abduljalil phoned CDA to say that without container numbers it was not possible for the UAEG to inspect a ship that contained up to

600 containers, but implied they were doing their best. He also asked what the USG wanted the UAE to do with the cargo if it was seized and whether China would take it back. CDA told Abduljalil that he had flagged the issue of the container numbers and understood the difficulty, but at this time we had no further information to share.

¶4. (S/NF) At approximately 2230, in response to call from Department, CDA immediately contacted Abduljalil to make arrangements for passing the container numbers provided in ref B email and then personally delivered the numbers to the MFA duty officer just after 2300 hours. Abduljalil thanked CDA for the information, which he said he would convey to Dubai Customs, and again indicated that the UAEG was interested in full cooperation. It was unclear, however, whether the vessel, scheduled to depart at 1900, was still in port. The morning of August 5, Embassy learned that the container numbers arrived too late to be of use. Sometime between 2200 and 2300, the "Iran Isfahan" departed Port Rashid.

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: In order to improve the likelihood of the UAE favorably responding to U.S. interdiction requests, it is critical that Embassy provide the UAE with as much actionable information as possible. Although we cannot guarantee that the UAE would have inspected or detained the containers had we provided the container numbers at the time of the initial request, it does appear that such information may increase our chances of success in the future. Additionally, the MFA Asst U/S communicated repeatedly his wish to cooperate and laid out several criteria that the UAEG says must be met in order for it to positively respond to these requests: 1) evidence that the material is controlled; 2) confirmation that the country of origin wants the material returned; 3) as much advance notice as possible. CDA explained that we cannot always meet these criteria, and can provide only the information we have. However, Embassy notes that our chances of successfully interdicting suspicious cargo will perhaps increase if we are able to offer specific, complete, and actionable information at the outset. End comment.

QUINN